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!THE	MECHANICAL	TURK	
Enduring	Misapprehensions	Concerning	A.I.	!
!A	curtain	is	withdrawn	and	a	machine	rolled	to	within	twelve	feet	of	the	nearest	spectators:	a	large	box	of	maple	wood	on	castors	or	brazen	rollers	with	a	puppet	like	a	pantomime	Turk	at	the	back.	His	right	arm	extended	to	the	checker-board	on	 the	 table,	 his	 left	 supporting	 a	 pipe,	 the	 Turk	 is	wrapped	 in	 a	 heavy	 green	cloak.	 But	 is	 discovered	 to	 consist	 of	 mechanical	 parts,	 operated	 by	 a	 larger	clockwork	 engine	 in	 the	 box. 	 Having	 inspected	 the	 compartments	 containing	1this	mechanism,	spectators	engage	the	Mechanical	Turk	in	a	game	of	chess:	the	Turk	moving	the	pieces	with	his	 left	hand,	eyes	and	head	rolling	in	triumph,	on	putting	 his	 enemy	 into	 check	 he	 will	 cry	 Échec! Échec!	Built	 by	Wolfgang	 von	Kempelen	for	the	Empress	Maria	Theresa	in	1769,	the	Turk	is	said	to	have	won	games	against	Benjamin	Franklin	and	Napoleon	Bonaparte,	mystifying	audiences	in	Europe	and	America	with	a	winning-streak	lasting	84	years.	(Only	ended	by	a	Vire	 in	 1854,	 in	 which	 the	 mechanism	 is	 said	 to	 have	 perished	 screaming:	
Échec!). 	In	his	own	eyewitness	account	of	the	Automaton,	produced	shortly	after	2seeing	the	chess-player	in	action	while	on	tour	in	America	in	1836,	Edgar	Allen	Poe	 suggests	 that	 no	 exhibition	 of	 the	 kind	 has	 ever	 elicited	 such	 speculation.	‘Wherever	 seen	 it	 has	 been	 an	 object	 of	 intense	 curiosity,	 to	 all	 persons	 who	think’,	 remarks	Poe.	 ‘Yet	 the	question	of	 its	modus	operandi	 is	still	undecided	…	accordingly	 we	 Vind	 every	 where	 men	 of	 mechanical	 genius,	 of	 great	 general	acuteness,	and	discriminative	understanding,	who	make	no	scruple	in	pronoun-cing	 the	 Automaton	 a	 pure	 machine,	 unconnected	 with	 human	 agency	 in	 its	movements,	and	consequently,	beyond	all	comparison,	 the	most	astonishing	 	of	the	inventions	of	mankind.’ 	3
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!Long	after	its	destruction	Von	Kempelen’s	Turk	continues	to	Vire	the	imagination;	an	eighteenth	century	fantasy	that	anticipates	the	twenty-Virst	century	reality	we	now	inhabit;	a	tangible	example	of	how	one	era	might	be	said	to	dream	the	next.	In	work	by	cyberneticians	Claude	Shannon	and	Herbert	Wiener	 the	Mechanical	Turk	 is	represented	(in	a	rhetorical	 Vlourish)	as	precursor	to	the	computer,	and	thus	 as	harbinger	 to	 the	processing	power	 that	 is	 to	 bring	 about	 the	 “absolute	catastrophe”	and	“the	End	of	Man”.	At	 its	peak	in	the	sixties,	 the	“catastrophist”	discourse	of	 theorists	 such	 as	Maurice	Blanchot	 and	Lewis	Mumford	predicted	that	the	coming	technological	utopia	must	bring	about	a	perpetual	stasis,	the	end	of	mankind	and	historical	progress,	as	every	potential	future	was	mapped	out	in	advance	by	an	ever	greater	processing	power.	‘The	full-blown,	the	absolute	cata-strophe	would	be	a	true	omnipresence	of	all	networks,	a	total	transparency	of	all	data’,	 declares	 Baudrillard,	 ‘…	 the	 culminating	 point	 of	 the	 development	 of	 in-formation	and	communications,	which	is	to	say,	death.’ )	Of	course,	Shannon	and	4Wiener	are	under	no	illusions	concerning	the	true	nature	of	the	Mechanical	Turk.	As	Walter	Benjamin	points	out,	in	his	Theses	on	the	Philosophy	of	History	(1940),	the	Turkish	sorcerer	was	a	conVidence	 trick:	operated	by	a	 little	hunchback	sat	inside	the	table,	concealed	by	a	system	of	mirrors,	and	guiding	the	puppet’s	hand	by	means	of	strings. 	But	I	would	 like	to	suggest	such	playful	references	to	Von	5Kempelen’s	fraud	in	the	mid-century	literature	relating	to	cybernetics	are	telling	nevertheless.	 For	 the	 computational	 technologies	preVigured	by	 the	Mechanical	Turk	have	in	fact	generated	serious	and	enduring	misapprehensions	concerning	ArtiVicial	 Intelligence:	 in	 the	Social	Democratic	consensus	 from	1950-1975,	and	then,	subsequently,	in	a	paradigm	which	is,	ostensibly	at	least,	Post-Modern	and	Neo-Liberal.	Although	there	be	too	little	space	here	to	retrace	the	theoretical	and	practical	developments	whereby	computers	have	impacted	upon	our	perception	of	history	to	produce	orthodoxies	of	the	End	in	the	postwar	period,	the	following	essay	will	at	least	discover	how	that	system	of	mirrors	has	worked;	will	establish	that	the	threat	computers	are	often	represented	as	posing	to	human	agency	and	even	identity,	 in	material	ranging	from	popular	science-Viction	to	post-humanist	philosophy,	is	in	truth,	as	Poe	would	seem	to	be	suggesting,	nothing	less	than	an	uncanny	effect.			
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! I.	THE	ANALYTICAL	ENGINE	
!In	a	rigorous	piece	of	investigative	journalism,	anticipating	the	methodology	and	philosophy	of	his	Victional	detective	M.	Dupin,	Edgar	Allen	Poe	sets	out	to	reveal	the	secret	of	the	Mechanical	Turk,	and	concludes	it	is	quite	certain	the	operation	of	the	Automaton	is	regulated	by	a	human	agent	and	nothing	else,	going	so	far	as	to	assert	that	the	matter	is	susceptible	of	a	mathematical	demonstration,	a	priori.	‘Let	us	place	the	Virst	move	in	a	game	of	chess,	in	juxtaposition	with	the	data	of	an	algebraical	question,	 and	 their	great	difference	will	be	 immediately	perceived’. 	6Recalling	the	‘calculating	machine’	developed	by	Charles	Babbage,	Poe	observes	that	 the	 arithmetical	 or	 algebraical	 calculations	 performed	 by	 this	 ‘engine	 of	wood	and	metal’,	however	complex,	proceed	necessarily	and	inevitably	to	the	one	solution	 that	must	 follow	 from	 the	 data:	 ‘The	 second	 step	 having	 been	 a	 con-sequence	of	the	data,	 the	third	step	is	equally	a	consequence	of	the	second,	the	fourth	of	the	third,	the	Vifth	of	the	fourth,	and	so	on,	and	not	possibly	otherwise,	to	 the	end’. 	But	 from	the	 Virst	move	 in	a	game	of	chess	no	step	necessarily	 fol7 -lows;	the	uncertainty	of	each	ensuing	move	increasing,	one	cannot	predict	with	any	accuracy	more	than	a	few	moves	ahead.	‘Even	granting	(what	should	not	be	granted)	that	the	movements	of	the	Automaton	Chess-Player	were	in	themselves	determinate,	they	would	be	necessarily	interrupted	and	disarranged	by	the	inde-terminate	will	of	his	antagonist.’ 	So	Poe	concludes	 that:	 ‘There	 is	 then	no	ana8 -logy	whatever	between	the	operations	of	the	Chess-Player,	and	those	of	the	calcu-lating	machine	of	Mr.	Babbage,	 and	 if	we	 choose	 to	 call	 the	 former	 a	pure	ma-chine	we	must	be	prepared	to	admit	that	 it	 is,	beyond	all	comparison,	the	most	wonderful	of	the	inventions	of	mankind.’ 		9
!Poe	could	not	have	known	that	the	concept	of	the	“calculating	machine”	under-pinning	his	“demonstration”	was	being	rendered	obsolete,	even	as	he	wrote,	by	the	inception	of	Babbage’s	Analytical	Engine.	In	a	series	of	notes	that	contain	the	most	important	information	relating	to	this	project	published	seven	years	laters	in	1843,	Ada	Lovelace	observes	there	is	‘considerable	vagueness	and	inaccuracy	
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in	 the	 minds	 of	 persons	 in	 general	 regarding	 the	 subject’	 of	 Babbage’s	 work.	‘There	is	a	misty	notion	amongst	most	of	those	who	have	attended	at	all	to	it,’	she	writes,	 ‘that	 two	 “calculating	machines”	have	been	successively	 invented	by	 the	same	person	within	the	last	few	years;	while	others	again	have	never	heard	but	of	 the	one	original	 “calculating	machine”,	 and	are	not	aware	of	 there	being	any	extension	upon	 this.’	While	 the	 Virst	 engine	developed	by	Babbage,	was	 strictly	
arithmetical,	 the	 results	 it	 could	arrive	at	 lying	within	a	 clearly	deVined	and	re-stricted	range,	 the	powers	of	 the	new	Analytical	Engine	were	co-extensive	with	our	knowledge	of	the	laws	of	analysis	itself.	 ‘Indeed’,	remarks	Lovelace,	‘we	may	consider	 the	engine	as	 the	material	and	mechanical	representative	of	analysis	…	the	executive	manipulation	of	algebraical	and	numerical	signals.’	Inspired	by	the	chains	of	punched	cards	employed	in	mechanised	Jacquard	looms	to	regulate	the	production	of	complex	textile	patterns,	Babbage	had	invented	a	 	physical	system	for	encoding	and	uploading	a	computer	program,	which	anticipated	 the	perfor-ated	 paper	 tapes	 that	 would	 later	 be	 used	 to	 transfer	 data	 to	 the	 ROM	 and	EPROM	 on	 the	 Virst	 minicomputers.	 ‘The	 bounds	 of	 arithmetic	 were	 …	 over-stepped	the	moment	the	idea	of	applying	the	cards	had	emerged;	and	the	Analyt-ical	Machine	does	not	occupy	common	ground	with	mere	“calculating	machines”,’	concludes	 Lovelace.	 ‘We	may	 say	most	 aptly,	 that	 the	Analytical	 Engine	weaves	
algebraical	 patterns	 just	 as	 the	 Jacquard-loom	 weaves	 Vlowers	 and	 leaves.’	 In-deed,	Alan	Turing	later	acknowledged,	the	machine	is	at	 least	potentially	an	ex-ample	of	the	“Universal	Logic	Machine”	he	laid	the	groundwork	for	in	his	paper	‘On	 Computable	 Numbers,	 with	 an	 Application	 to	 the	 Entscheidungsproblem’	(1936):	and	could	therefore	have	run	a	chess-program	(like	the	program	Turing	developed	while	at	Bletchley	Park	during	the	Second	World	War)	which	assigns	numerical	 values	 to	 pieces,	 positions	 and	 potential	 for	 future	 positioning	 then	selects	 the	 one	 move	 with	 the	 greatest	 value	 and	 the	 greatest	 position-play	value. 	10
!One	 cannot	but	wonder	whether	Poe	might	have	been	 the	 Virst	 person	 to	have	realised	this.	Certainly,	there	is	a	marked	change	of	emphasis	in	his	next	piece	of	writing	about	chess,	in	the	preamble	to	‘The	Murders	in	the	Rue	Morgue’	(1841),	which	might	suggest	that	Poe	had	learned	of	the	Analytical	Engine	in	the	interim.	
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(Poe	could	not	have	 read	Lovelace’s	notes,	nor	Babbage’s	unpublished	descrip-tion	of	the	Analytical	Engine	in	his	essay	‘On	the	mathematical	powers	of	the	cal-culating	engine’	[1937],	nor	the	original	Italian-language	version	of	the	‘Sketch	of	the	Analytical	Engine’	produced	by	L.F.	Menabrea	(1842),	before	writing	the	Virst	of	his	 three	stories	about	Dupin;	but	Poe	was	clearly	 following	Babbage’s	work	with	considerable	interest,	and	his	story	might	be	a	response	to	information	con-cerning	 the	 second	engine	contained	 in	a	 letter	 from	Babbage	 to	Quetelet	pub-lished	 in	Bulletins	 de	 l’Académie	Royal	 des	 Sciences	 et	Belles-Lettres	 de	Bruxelles	(May	1835)	 and	 in	 a	 collection	of	 essays	 called	The	Ninth	Bridgewater	Treatise	(1837).)	On	the	one	hand,	chess	is	no	longer	thought	to	be	beyond	those	‘arith-metical	or	algebraical	calculations’	one	might	perform	on	a	machine. 	In	fact,	‘to	11observe	attentively’,	‘to	remember	distinctly’,	‘to	have	a	retentive	memory’	and	‘to	proceed	by	the	book’,	are	now	considered	to	be	the	‘sum	total	of	good	playing’. 	12But	in	both	‘Murders	in	the	Rue	Morgue’	and	‘The	Purloined	Letter’,	Poe	takes	is-sue	 with	 popular	 errors	 relating	 to	 the	 term	 analysis,	 promulgated	 by	 certain	mathematicians. 	 ‘The	 faculty	 of	 re-solution	 is	 possibly	 much	 invigorated	 by	13mathematical	 study,	 and	especially	by	 that	highest	branch	of	 it	which,	unjustly,	and	merely	on	account	of	its	retrograde	operations,	has	been	called,	as	if	par	ex-
cellence,	analysis.’ 	But	to	calculate	is	not	to	analyse.	In	fact,	the	‘constructive	or	14combining	power’	is	a	‘primitive	faculty’,	so	‘frequently	seen	in	those	whose	intel-lect	bordered	otherwise	upon	idiocy	…	as	to	have	attracted	general	observation	among	 writers	 on	 morals’. 	 If	 this	 is	 not	 generally	 understood,	 the	 ‘elaborate	15frivolity	 of	 chess’	 might	 help	 to	 explain	 why:	 ‘the	 pieces	 have	 different	 and	bizarre	motions,	with	various	and	variable	values,	[and	in	consequence]	what	is	only	 complex	 is	mistaken	 (a	not	unusual	 error)	 for	what	 is	profound’. 	Having	16rejected	‘this	particular	deception’,	Poe	posits	a	rather	more	comprehensive	con-ception	 of	 analysis	 that	 extends	 beyond	 mathematical	 reason,	 and	 the	 ‘pagan	fables’	of	algebra. 	‘Our	player	conVines	himself	not	at	all;	nor,	because	the	game	17is	 the	object,	 does	he	 reject	deductions	 from	 things	external	 to	 the	game’. 	 In18 -stead,	‘the	analyst	throws	himself	into	the	spirit	of	his	opponent,	identiVies	him-self	 therewith,	 and	 not	 infrequently	 sees	 thus,	 at	 a	 glance,	 the	 sole	 methods)	sometimes	indeed	absurdly	simple	ones)	by	which	he	may	seduce	into	error	or	hurry	 into	 miscalculation’. 	 According	 to	 Poe,	 simple	 games	 like	 draughts	 or	19
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whist	might,	 therefore,	provide	a	better	means	of	 testing	 the	highest	powers	of	the	intellect;	 in	the	former,	for	instance,	where	the	moves	are	homogenous,	and	far	 less	 calculating	 power	 is	 required,	 advantages	 are	 said	 to	 be	 obtained	 ‘by	either	party	only	through	superior	acumen’. 	In	the	stories	that	follow,	the	ana20 -lytical	 powers	 of	 Dupin	 would	 invariably	 surpass	 the	 immense	 processing	 or	computational	power	of	the	Parisian	police-force.	—	‘His	results,	brought	about	by	 the	 very	 soul	 and	 essence	 of	 method,	 have	 in	 truth,	 the	 whole	 air	 of	intuition.’ 	21
!Poe’s	 thoughts	on	chess	and	analysis	were	 to	prove	remarkably	prescient,	anti-cipating	the	problems	that	would	preoccupy	the	mid-twentieth-century	pioneers	of	ArtiVicial	Intelligence.	As	Poe	perceived,	chess	does	in	fact	require	far	greater	computational	power	than	draughts.	‘Not	only	is	the	end	game	different	from	the	middle	 game	 in	 the	 considerations	which	are	paramount,	 but	 the	openings	 are	much	more	devoted	to	getting	the	pieces	into	a	position	of	 free	mobility,	 for	at-tack	and	deVines	that	is	the	middle	game’,	explains	Norbert	Wiener	in	Cybernetics.	‘The	result	is	that	we	cannot	be	even	approximately	content	with	a	uniform	eval-uation	of	 the	various	weighting	 factors	 for	 the	game	as	a	whole’. 	And	while	 it	22would	 prove	 easy	 enough	 to	 program	 machines	 that	 could	 play	 a	 ‘tolerable	game’	(Turing)	/	‘a	chess	not	so	manifestly	bad	as	to	be	ridiculous’	(Wiener),	the	shortcomings	of	what	Poe	termed	‘an	exaggeration	of	the	application	of	the	one	principle	or	set	of	principles	of	 search’	 soon	became	all	 too	evident. 	 ‘You	will	23Vind	 that	when	 the	same	situation	comes	up	 twice	on	 the	chessboard,	your	op-ponent’s	reaction	will	be	the	same	each	time,	and	you	will	Vind	that	he	has	a	very	rigid	personality’,	says	Wiener.	 ‘It	is	thus	not	too	hard	for	an	expert	to	get	a	line	on	 his	machine	 opponent	 and	 to	 defeat	 him	 every	 time.’ 	What	 was	 required	24clearly	was	 a	 computer	which	would	 perform	 the	 sort	 of	 observations	 that	 in-form	 Poe’s	 Analyst.	 ‘Let	 us	 suppose	 [the	 machine]	 examines	 all	 the	 previous	games	which	it	has	recorded	on	its	memory	to	determine	what	weighting	of	the	different	evaluations	of	the	worth	of	pieces,	command,	mobility,	and	the	like,	will	conduce	most	to	winning,’	suggests	Wiener.	 ‘In	this	way,	 it	 learns	not	only	 from	its	own	failures	but	its	opponent’s	successes.’ 	Unfortunately,	‘All	this	is	very	dif25 -Vicult	to	do	in	chess,	and	as	a	matter	of	fact	the	full	development	of	this	technique,	
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so	as	to	give	rise	to	a	machine	that	can	play	master	chess,	has	not	been	accom-plished.’ 	And	that	remains	the	case	today,	over	Vifty	years	later	—	as	philosoph26 -er	 and	Turing	 specialist	 B.	 Jack	 Copeland	 has	 pointed	 out:	 ‘The	 huge	 improve-ment	 in	 computer	 chess	 since	 Turing’s	 day	 owes	 much	 more	 to	 advances	 in	hardware	engineering	than	to	advances	in	AI.’ 	The	victory	of	IBM’s	chess-play27 -ing	computer	Deep	Blue	over	Russian	Grand	Master	Garry	Kasparov	was	the	res-ult	not	of	a	learning	algorithm	but	of	256	parallel	processors	examining	200	mil-lion	possible	moves	per	second	and	strategies	extending	fourteen	moves	ahead.	As	 Noam	 Chomsky	 remarked,	 the	 outcome	 was	 as	 meaningful	 as	 a	 bulldozer	winning	 a	 weight-lifting	 competition. 	 ‘In	 fact,	 little	 or	 nothing	 about	 human	28thought	processes	appears	to	have	been	learned	from	the	series	of	projects	that	culminated	in	Deep	Blue.’ 					29
!Though	this	 is	not	 the	 impression	people	 formed	at	 the	 time.	 ‘As	Kasparov	sus-pected,	his	duel	with	Deep	Blue	indeed	became	an	icon	in	musings	on	the	mean-ing	and	dignity	of	human	life’,	observed	Robert	Wright	in	Time	Magazine	(1996);	‘he	seemed	to	personify	some	kind	of	identity	crisis	that	computers	have	induced	in	our	species.’ 	In	fact,	the	popular	reaction	to	the	triumph	of	IBM	is	consistent	30with	a	tendency	to	invest	chess-playing	computers	with	deeply-rooted	anxieties	concerning	 the	development	of	ArtiVicial	 Intelligence.	The	 Virst	 robot	 in	English	literature	was	 ‘Moxon’s	Master’	 (1893),	 a	 chess-playing	 automaton	 inspired	 by	Von	Kempelen’s	Turk:	 ‘not	more	 than	 Vive	 feet	 in	height,	with	proportions	 sug-gesting	those	of	a	gorilla	—	a	tremendous	breadth	of	shoulders,	thick,	short	neck	and	broad,	squat	head,	which	had	a	tangled	growth	of	hair	and	was	topped	with	a	crimson	 fez.’ 	 Beginning	 with	 the	 question	 that	 preoccupied	 Time	 Magazine	31(does	 a	machine	 think	 about	 the	work	 it	 is	 doing?),	 Ambrose	 Bierce	 describes	how	Moxon	is	murdered	one	night	after	beating	his	creature	at	its	own	game:	‘the	whole	 room	 blazed	with	 a	 blinding	white	 light	 that	 burned	 into	my	 brain	 and	heart	and	memory	a	vivid	picture	of	the	combatants	on	the	Vloor,	Moxon	under-neath,	 his	 throat	 still	 in	 the	 clutch	 of	 those	 iron	 hands,	 his	 head	 thrown	 back-ward,	his	eyes	protruding,	his	mouth	wide	open	and	his	tongue	thrust	out;	and	—	horrible	contrast!	—	upon	the	painted	face	of	his	assassin	an	expression	of	tran-quil	and	profound	thought,	as	 in	the	solution	of	a	problem	in	chess!’ 	The	HAL	32
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9000	adopts	a	similar	course	of	action	immediately	after	playing	a	game	of	chess	in	Stanley	Kubrick’s	2001:	A	Space	Odyssey	 (1968),	 and	 the	US	 intercontinental	ballistic	missile	system	“Joshua”	suggests	that	Matthew	Broderick	might	prefer	a	“nice	game	of	chess”,	before	settling	for	Global	Thermonuclear	War	in	John	Ban-ham’s	War	Games	(1983).	So,	while	Poe	is	surely	correct	to	suggest	that	what	is	
merely	complex	has	been	consistently	mistaken	for	what	is	profound,	one	cannot	but	wonder	whether	this	might	not	itself	be	a	signiVicant	mistake,	integral	to	the	pervasive	 cultural	 unease,	 which	 has	 so	 long	 surrounded	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 ma-chines.	
!In	 his	 famous	 essay	 on	 ‘The	 Uncanny’	 (1919),	 Freud	 refers	 to	 the	 impression	made	on	us	by	waxwork	Vigures,	ingeniously	constructed	dolls	and	automata,	and	observes	 that	 particularly	 favourable	 conditions	 for	 generating	 feelings	 of	 the	uncanny	seem	to	exist	if	intellectual	uncertainty	is	aroused	as	to	whether	a	thing	is	animate	or	inanimate. 	Freud	recalls	that,	young	children	make	no	sharp	dis33 -tinction	between	the	animate	and	the	inanimate,	but	are	especially	fond	of	treat-ing	their	dolls	as	if	they	were	alive,	and	speculates	that	the	sense	of	the	uncanny	might	 ‘derive	not	from	an	infantile	 fear,	but	from	an	infantile	wish’. 	—	Our	in34 -clination	 to	 attribute	 thought	 to	 automata	 might	 have	 begun	 as	 an	 insurance	against	extinction,	an	attempt	to	cheat	death	by	investing	 	physical	objects	with	
ego,	on	the	misguided	conviction	that	thoughts	are	omnipotent.	 ‘But	these	 ideas	arose	on	the	soil	of	boundless	self-love,	the	primordial	narcissism	that	dominates	the	mental	life	of	both	the	child	and	primitive	man,	and	when	this	phase	is	sur-mounted,	the	meaning	of	the	“double”	changes:	having	once	been	an	assurance	of	immortality,	it	becomes	the	uncanny	harbinger	of	death.’ 	The	cultural	anxieties	35generated	by	ArtiVicial	Intelligence,	together	with	our	consistently	overrating	the	signiVicance	 of	 its	 achievements,	 must	 indicate	 that	 what	 we	 are	 dealing	 with	here	 is	an	uncanny	effect.	 In	 this	one	respect,	 though	they	possess	no	technical	similarities,	IBM’s	Deep	Blue	was	no	less	a	conjuring-trick	than	Von	Kempelen’s	Mechanical	Turk.		
!If	all	this	seems	inconsequential,	note	that	Turing	Virst	conceived	of	the	‘Imitation	Game’	which	has	become	the	foundation	for	post-humanist	philosophies	relating	
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to	AI	as	a	game	of	chess.	Explaining	it	is	not	difVicult	to	devise	a	program	that	will	play	a	 ‘not	very	bad	game	of	chess’,	Turing	proposes	a	 ‘little	experiment’.	—	Get	three	men	as	subjects	for	the	experiment:	A,	B,	C.	Two	of	these,	let	us	say,	A	and	C	are	to	be	rather	poor	chess	players.	B	is	to	do	no	more	than	work	the	machine.	Two	 rooms	 are	 used	with	 some	 arrangement	 for	 communicating	moves,	 and	 a	game	of	chess	is	to	be	played	between	C	and	either	A	or	the	machine	B.	The	point	of	the	experiment	is	to	demonstrate	that	‘C	may	Vind	it	quite	difVicult	to	tell	which	he	is	playing’. 	(According	to	Turing,	this	was	an	idealised	form	of	an	experiment	36he	had	actually	done	—	probably	with	the	Champernownes	at	Bletchley	Park). 	37As	we	shall	see,	this	is	remarkably	close	to	the	Vinal	form	of	the	so-called	‘Turing	Test’	or	‘Imitation	Game’	that	would	soon	follow	—	and	this	must	have	profound	implications	for	how	we	interpret	an	experiment	widely	regarded	as	an	empirical	measure	 for	AI.	For	 this	 supposedly	behaviourist	or	operationalist	 criterion	 for	thinking	is	clearly	designed	to	gauge	an	uncanny	effect.	—	‘Playing	against	such	a	machine’,	 writes	 Turing,	 ‘gives	 a	 deVinite	 feeling	 that	 one	 is	 pitting	 one’s	 wits	against	something	alive.’ 		38
!
!II.	THE	IMITATION	GAME	
!In	his	famous	essay	‘Computing	Machinery	and	Intelligence’	(1950),	Turing	sets	out	 to	 investigate	 whether	 machines	 can	 think.	 But	 (for	 the	 very	 reason	Descartes	refused	to	consider	whether	he	is	a	Rational	Animal)	Turing	proposes	to	replace	this	question	by	another,	which	is	closely	related	to	it,	but	which	will	be	expressed,	claims	Turing,	in	relatively	unambiguous	words.	—	‘This	new	form	of	the	problem	can	be	described	in	terms	of	a	game	which	we	call	the	“imitation	game”’. 	This	party-game	is	played	by	three	people,	a	man	(A),	a	woman	(B),	and	39an	interrogator	(C)	in	a	room	apart	from	the	other	two	who	may	be	of	either	sex.	The	object	of	the	game	for	the	third	player	is	to	determine	which	is	the	man	and	which	is	the	woman;	the	interrogator	will	present	the	other	players	with	a	series	of	questions,	and	the	answers	will	be	mediated	in	some	fashion	to	ensure	the	in-terrogator	decides	solely	upon	the	answers	provided.	The	object	of	the	game	for	
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the	 Virst	 player	 is	 to	 deceive	 the	 interrogator	 into	 believing	 he	 is	 the	 woman,	while	the	object	for	the	second	player	is	to	prevent	this	from	happening.	‘She	can	add	such	things	as	“I	am	the	woman,	don’t	listen	to	him!”	to	her	answers,	but	it	will	 avail	 nothing	 as	 the	man	 can	make	 similar	 remarks.’ 	 Having	 set	 out	 the	40rules	of	the	game	Turing	then	invites	us	to	imagine	what	will	happen	when	a	ma-chine	takes	the	part	of	the	man?	This	is	the	‘more	accurate	form	of	the	question’	that	 replaces	 the	original	problem:	—	“Will	 the	 interrogator	decide	wrongly	as	often	 when	 the	 game	 is	 played	 like	 this	 as	 he	 does	 when	 the	 game	 is	 played	between	a	man	and	a	woman?’ 	—	And	Turing	is	in	no	doubt	as	to	what	the	an41 -swer	might	be:	predicting	that	machines	certainly	could	 triumph	in	such	a	con-test,	he	even	speculates	that	this	might	happen	by	the	end	of	the	20th	century.	‘I	believe	that	in	about	Vifty	years’	time	it	will	be	possible	to	programme	computers,	with	a	 storage	 capacity	of	 about	109,	 to	make	 them	play	 the	 imitation	game	so	well	that	an	average	interrogator	will	not	have	more	than	70	per	cent.	chance	of	making	 the	 right	 identiVication	 after	 Vive	minutes	 of	 questioning.’ 	And	 though	42the	original	question	“Can	machines	think?”	is	dismissed	as	 ‘too	meaningless	to	deserve	discussion’,	Turing	nevertheless	afVirms	his	belief	that	‘by	the	end	of	the	century	the	use	of	words	and	general	educated	opinion	will	have	altered	so	much	that	one	will	be	able	to	speak	of	machines	thinking	without	expecting	to	be	con-tradicted.’ 				43
!Debate	has	raged	ever	since	as	to	what	Turing	might	have	intended,	and	the	crit-ical	 literature	on	the	Imitation	Game	comprises	a	vast	and	bewildering	array	of	differing	interpretations.	The	matter	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	in	the	same	essay	Turing	presents	a	different	version	of	the	game,	where	the	computer	plays	the	part	of	A	and	the	part	of	B	is	‘taken	by	a	man’. 	This	has	provoked	comment44 -ators	such	as	S.G.	Sterrett,	in	‘Turing’s	Two	Tests	for	Intelligence’	(2000),	to	dis-tinguish	between	what	he	 terms	1)	 the	 “Original	 Imitation	Game”,	 in	which	 the	objective	 is	 for	 the	 computer	 to	 impersonate	 the	woman,	 and	2)	 the	 “Standard	Interpretation”	of	 the	 “Turing	Test”,	 in	which	 the	objective	 is	 to	 imitate	a	 ‘man’,	with	 the	 latter	 generally	 being	 understood	 to	mean	human	 rather	 than	merely	
male. 	And	 though	commentators	often	miss	or	 reject	 the	possibility	of	 such	a	45distinction,	there	is	a	general	agreement	that	Turing	had	really	been	trying	to	as-
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sess	 a	 computer	 programme’s	 ability	 to	 imitate	 a	 human	 being,	 rather	 than	 to	simulate	a	woman.	This	“Standard	Interpretation”	might	seem	to	Vind	support	in	Turing’s	later	articles	and	broadcasts,	where	he	says	simply	that	‘The	idea	of	the	test	 is	 that	 the	machine	has	 to	 try	and	pretend	to	be	a	man’,	and	that	our	main	problem	is	to	‘programme	a	machine	to	imitate	a	brain’. 	And	it	is	the	“Standard	46Interpretation”	 that	has	provided	 the	 criterion	 for	 the	Loebner	Prize,	 a	 famous	annual	 competition	 in	which	 computer	 programmes	 compete	 for	 a	 gold	medal	and	an	award	of	$1000,000.	The	outcome	of	 such	competitions	arouse	 interest	far	beyond	the	small	community	of	specialists	in	AI	because	it	is	widely	believed	that	Turing	was	offering	his	test	as	a	means	of	deVining	the	nebulous	term	‘think-ing’.	 ‘An	especially	inVluential	behaviourist	deVinition	of	 intelligence	was	put	for-ward	by	Turing’,	writes	psychiatrist	Ned	Block;	and	this	assumption	is	shared	by	philosopher	John	Searle	and	physicist	Roger	Penrose	in	their	own	landmark	as-sessments.	‘The	operationalist	would	say	that	the	computer	thinks	provided	that	it	acts	 indistinguishably	 from	the	way	that	a	person	acts	when	thinking,’	writes	Penrose	‘This	viewpoint	was	argued	of	very	forcefully	in	a	famous	article	by	Alan	Turing…’ 	—	Though,	as	Turing’s	editor,	B.	 Jack	Copeland	remarks,	Turing	says	47quite	explicitly	that	his	aim	is	not	to	give	a	deVinition	of	thinking	but	rather	a	‘cri-
terion	 for	“thinking”’. 	The	result	of	this	emphasis	on	the	“Standard	Interpreta48 -tion”	of	Turing’s	Test	as	a	means	of	verifying	the	claims	of	what	Searle	and	Pen-rose	term	‘strong	AI’	is	that	the	“Original	Imitation	Game”	is	often	considered	ir-relevant	 or	misleading:	 dismissed	 by	 Turing’s	 biographer	Andrew	Hodges	 as	 a	‘red	herring’,	and	regarded	by	Turing’s	biographer	as	just	part	of	the	protocol	for	scoring	 the	 test:	 ‘Will	 interrogators	 decide	 wrongly	 as	 often	 in	 man-imitates-woman	games	as	they	do	in	computer-imitates-human	games?’ 	49
!In	recent	years	this	critical	consensus	has	come	under	attack	following	renewed	interest	 in	what	Sterret	 terms	 the	“Original	 Imitation	Game”.	 In	 their	recent	re-ception	history	Ayse	Pinar	Saygin,	Ilyas	Cicekli	and	Varol	Akman	note	that,	while	the	woman	vanishes	altogether	in	the	second	version	of	the	game	which	under-pins	the	“Standard	Interpretation”,	the	objectives	of	A,	B	and	the	Interrogator	re-main	unaltered,	as	Turing		never	explicitly	says	these	have	changed;	that	both	the	machine	and	 the	man	are	still	 impersonating	a	woman. 	 In	 their	opinion,	 ‘The	50
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man	 and	 the	 machine	 are	 measured	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 respective	 performance	against	real	women.’ 	And	they	suggest	that,	though	there	is	an	ambiguity	in	the	51paper,	the	change	in	the	second	game	is	intended	to	stress	the	point	that	the	sim-ulations	are	to	be	compared	against	each	other	and	not	that	which	they	are	simu-lating.	‘On	close	examination	it	can	be	seen	that	what	Turing	proposes	is	to	com-pare	 the	 machine’s	 success	 against	 that	 of	 the	 man,	 not	 to	 look	 at	 whether	 it	“beats”	 the	 woman	 in	 the	 IG.’ 	 Saygin,	 Cicekli	 and	 Akman	 conclude	 that,	 ‘The	52crucial	point	seems	to	be	that	the	notion	of	imitation	Vigures	more	prominently	in	Turing’s	paper	than	is	commonly	acknowledged.’ 		53
!Though	a	tiny	number	of	commentators	have	come	to	this	conclusion	they	have	failed	to	recognise	purpose	and	utility	in	Turing’s	design.	Patrick	Hayes	and	Ken-neth	 Ford,	 for	 instance,	write	 that	 ‘he	 tells	 us	 quite	 clearly	 to	make	 a	 program	that	can	do	as	well	as	a	man	at	pretending	to	be	a	woman	…	a	mechanical	trans-vestite’	only	to	support	their	case	that	the	Turing	Test	is	a	blind	alley	as	imitating	human	capabilities	 should	not	be	 the	ultimate	goal	of	AI. 	But	once	we	accept	54the	criterion	with	which	Turing	replaces	the	question	“Can	a	Machine	Think?”	is	
not	 designed	 to	 ascertain	whether	 a	machine	 can	 think	 but	whether	 a	machine	can	produce	a	model	of	a	phenomenon	at	least	as	convincing	as	that	produced	by	a	man,	 then	the	purpose	and	utility	of	 the	Test	becomes	 immediately	apparent.	Indeed,	as	Searle	observes,	‘The	idea	that	computer	simulations	could	be	the	real	thing	ought	 to	have	 seemed	suspicious	 in	 the	 Virst	place	because	 the	 computer	isn’t	 conVined	 to	 simulating	mental	 operations	 by	 any	means.’ 	 Though	 reality	55can	never	be	represented	exactly	by	a	mathematical	model	what	we	do	produce	is	often	sufVicient	 for	our	purposes;	and	with	 the	proliferation	of	 cheap	and	 in-creasingly	sophisticated	 information	 technology	 the	use	of	 computers	 to	model	scientiVic,	 social	and	economic	phenomena	has	 in	 fact	become	 increasingly	pre-valent.	Only	an	obsessive	preoccupation	with	a	very	speciVic	and	peculiar	concep-tion	of	AI	can	have	prevented	us	from	seeing	that	the	Imitation	Game	provides	us	with	 the	 framework	 necessary	 for	 testing	 the	 success	 	 or	 the	 “intelligence”	 of	such	 simulations,	 setting	 the	 predictions	 against	 reality	 Virst;	 then	 against	 the	performance	of	proven	simulators,	in	order	to	ascertain	which	most	closely	cor-responds	 to	data	derived	 from	observations	 in	 the	 laboratory	or	 in	 the	 Vield.	 If	
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there	is	any	doubt	on	this	score	consider	that	Turing	introduces	yet	another	(and	surprisingly	overlooked)	 Imitation	Game	—	 in	which	humans	do	not	 feature	at	all.	 Proceeding	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 computer	 to	which	 he	 has	 referred	throughout	 performs	 satisfactorily	 (i.e.	 a	 Paper	 Machine:	 more	 on	 this	 later!)	Turing	suggests	that	his	Imitation	Game	could	even	be	reconVigured	in	a	way	that	might	permit	one	to	test	programmes	on	the	new	digital	computers.	 ‘The	imita-tion	game	could	then	be	played	with	the	machine	in	question	(as	B)	and	the	mim-icking	 digital	 computer	 (as	 A)	 and	 the	 interrogator	would	 be	 unable	 to	 distin-guish	them.’ 		56
!In	fact,	Turing’s	criterion	for	thinking	would	seem	to	be	Poe’s	criterion	for	analyt-
ical	thought	—	for	the	objective	of	the	machine	is	to	present	a	convincing	simula-tion	and	there	can	be	no	better	measure	of	success	than	deception	—	i.e.	‘seduce	into	 error	 or	 hurry	 into	 miscalculation’. 	 And	 having	 established	 this	 crucial	57point	one	cannot	but	wonder	whether	 the	huge	number	of	conVlicting	opinions	concerning	the	meaning	and	implications	of	the	Test	might	be	signiVicant.	Turing	was	 a	 computer	 programmer,	 and	 thus	 entirely	 capable	 of	writing	 instructions	which	are	not	open	to	misunderstanding;	his	paper	promised	a	new	form	of	the	problem	expressed	in	relatively	unambiguous	terms.	How	is	the	past	half-century	of	 incomprehension	 and	 interminable	 argument	 possible?	 The	 use	 of	 the	mis-leading	and	loaded	terms	“thinking”	and	“thought”	might	be	merely	unfortunate.	The	 resemblance	 of	 Turing’s	 Test	 to	 the	 famous	 Cartesian	 test	 for	 conscious	
thought	—	in	which	it	shown	that	no	one	could	mistake	a	‘clockwork	man’	for	a	human	with	a	soul	—	might	conceivably	be	dismissed	as	a	devastating	blunder. 	58But	how	to	account	for	his	mischievous	comments	about	the	future	being	like	the	chapters	 describing	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 machines	 in	 Samuel	 Butler’s	 fantasy	 novel	
Erewhon?	‘[It]	seems	probable	that	once	the	machine	thinking	method	had	star-ted,	it	would	not	take	long	to	outstrip	our	feeble	powers’,	writes	Turing.	‘At	some	stage	therefore	we	should	have	to	expect	the	machines	to	take	control’. 	An	em59 -barrassment	to	proponents	of	Strong	AI	—	‘this	is	comic-strip	stuff’ 	—	one	be60 -gins	 to	 understand	 precisely	 why	 Turing	 was	 seen	 to	 giggle	 when	 he	 penned	‘Computing	Machinery	 and	 Intelligence’. 	 I	 believe	 we	 should	 at	 least	 be	 pre61 -pared	to	entertain	the	possibility	that	the	enormous	confusion	surrounding	the	
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Turing	Test	in	something	rather	more	than	a	mere	accident.	The	very	imprecision	of	the	Imitation	Game	has	helped	to	produce	an	environment	in	which	interrog-ators	are	regularly	seduced	into	serious	errors	regarding	the	ontological	status	of	computers.	 Indeed,	Turing’s	article	 itself	might	be	regarded	as	a	programme	of	sorts,	 one	 that	has	won	game	after	 game	 (invariably	mistaken	 for	 a	passage	 in	Descartes),	 a	mechanism	 for	 dissimulation	with	 a	 track-record	 equal	 to	 that	 of	the	Mechanical	Turk.		
!Once	this	is	accepted	further	mysteries	concerning	the	Imitation	Game	begin	to	fall	 into	place.	 Consider	 the	 “Gödel	Argument”	 set	 out	 by	 the	philosopher	 John	Lucas	 in	 his	 famous	 article	 ‘Minds,	 Machines	 and	 Gödel	 (1961),	 which	 is	 de-veloped	at	length	by	Roger	Penrose	in	The	Emperor’s	New	Mind	(1989)	and	Shad-
ows	of	the	Mind	(1994).	As	Penrose	notes,	in	proving	no	algorithm	exists	for	de-ciding	whether	or	not	an	algorithm	run	on	a	Turing	machine	is	going	to	stop,	Tur-ing	himself	had	shown	that	there	can	be	no	general	algorithm	for	deciding	math-ematical	questions: 	‘By	Gödel’s	famous	theorem	or	some	similar	argument	[i.e.	62Church-Turing!],	 one	 can	 show	 that	 however	 the	machine	 is	 constructed	 there	are	bound	to	be	cases	where	the	machine	fails	to	give	an	answer,	but	a	mathem-atician	would	be	able	to’. 	And	so,	Lucas	and	Penrose	conclude,	the	human	mind	63
cannot	 be	 explained	 as	 an	 algorithm	 running	 on	 a	 Turing	machine.	 Indeed,	 in	Copeland’s	view,	 it	 is	virtually	 impossible	 to	say	what	mathematical	conception	of	 the	mind	 is	 available	 to	 someone	who	endorses	 the	Gödel	Argument	—	 ‘be-cause	the	objection,	 if	sound,	could	be	used	equally	well	 to	support	 the	conclu-sion,	not	only	 that	 the	mind	 is	not	a	Turing	machine,	but	also	 that	 it	 is	not	any	one	of	a	very	broad	range	of	machines.’ 	How	is	 this	apparent	contradiction	 in	64Turing’s	 thought	possible?	—	Penrose	merely	concludes	 that,	 ‘There	 is	perhaps	some	irony	in	the	fact	that	this	aspect	of	Turing’s	own	work	may	now	indirectly	provide	us	with	a	possible	loophole	to	his	own	viewpoint	concerning	the	nature	of	mental	phenomena.’ 	I	would	go	considerable	further,	and	suggest	it	 is	quite	65unthinkable	 that	 the	mathematician	who	established	the	existence	of	non-com-putable	numbers	could	have	been	suggesting	 in	all	 seriousness	 that	 the	human	mind	is	an	algorithm.	In	fact,	Turing	can	be	seen	to	have	anticipated	that	his	ori-ginal	and	imprecise	question	might	provoke	what	he	termed	the	“Mathematical	
!14
Objection”,	and	we	are	now	in	a	position	to	understand	his	response.	Citing	the	mathematicians	who	have	worked	 for	 centuries	 on	 the	question	 as	 to	whether	Fermat’s	last	theorem	is	true	or	not,	Turing	jokes	that,	‘The	short	answer	to	this	argument	 is	 that	 although	 it	 is	 established	 that	 there	 are	 limitations	 to	 the	powers	 of	 any	 particular	machine,	 it	 has	 only	 been	 stated,	without	 any	 sort	 of	proof,	that	no	such	limitations	apply	to	the	human	intellect’. 	But	Turing		insists	66he	does	not	‘think	this	view	can	be	dismissed	quite	so	lightly’,	and	his	careful	re-sponse	is	not	what	might	be	expected	of	a	proponent	of	Strong	AI. 	Turing	sets	67out	 procedures	whereby	 a	machine	might	 be	made	 to	 appear	 as	 though	 it	 had	overcome	the	Decision	Problem	—	permitted	to	risk	mistakes	for	the	sake	of	ex-periment	and	provided	with	a	memory-bank	where	the	results	can	be	stored,	a	programme	 could	modify	 itself	 over	 time,	 effectively	 becoming	 a	 different	ma-chine,	thereby	avoiding	the	problem	altogether.	Turing’s	machine	would	not	have	overcome	 the	 Mathematical	 Objection,	 but	 this	 deViciency	 would	 no	 longer	 be	apparent	 to	 the	 average	 interrogator.	 As	 Turing	 says,	 his	 contention	 is	 merely	that	 ‘machines	can	be	constructed	which	will	simulate	the	behaviour	of	the	hu-man	mind	very	closely.’ 	Evidently,	 the	point	 to	all	 this	has	nothing	 to	do	with	68substantiating	 the	 claims	 of	 Strong	 AI.	 Turing	 is	 concerned	 primarily	with	 the	production	 of	 a	machine	 that	will	 effectively	 simulate	 the	 natural	 phenomenon	that	is	at	once	the	most	familiar	to	us	and	the	most	challenging	to	model,	the	hu-man	mind.	And	this	may	explain	why	Turing	is	prepared	to	countenance	what	he	terms	 faking	—	predetermining	 some	of	 the	decisions	 that	must	be	made	by	a	machine	—	 in	order	 to	hasten	and	control	 its	 education	and	development. 	 ‘It	69would	be	quite	easy	to	arrange	the	experiences	in	such	a	way	that	they	automat-ically	 caused	 the	 structure	of	 the	machine	 to	build	up	 to	a	previously	 intended	form,	and	this	would	obviously	be	a	gross	form	of	cheating,	almost	on	a	par	with	having	a	man	inside	the	machine.’ 					70
!Finally,	I	would	like	to	suggest	we	are	now	in	a	position	to	resolve	one	of	the	most	puzzling	aspects	of	the	“Chinese	Room”.	In	this	famous	attack	on	the	Turing	Test	and	 the	 related	 claims	of	 Strong	AI,	 Searle	 (1980)	 imagines	he	 is	 locked	 into	 a	room	and	given	counters	marked	with	Chinese	symbols	together	with	a	set	of	in-structions	(in	English)	on	how	to	manipulate	them. 	Searle	then	passes	a	version	71
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of	 the	 Turing	 Test,	 providing	 appropriate	 responses	 to	 questions	 from	 outside	the	 room	 (written	 in	Hanzi)	merely	 by	 referring	 to	 his	 table	 of	 instructions	—	while	doggedly	 insisting	he	does	not	understand	one	word	of	Chinese!	 ‘For	 the	purposes	of	the	Chinese,	I	am	simply	an	instantiation	of	the	computer	program.’ 	72According	to	the	proponents	of	Strong	AI,	Searle	has	proven	that	he	understood	what	was	written	in	Chinese,	but	to	Searle	it	is	quite	obvious	he	has	not.	‘I	have	inputs	 and	 outputs	 that	 are	 indistinguishable	 from	 those	 of	 the	 native	 Chinese	speaker	and	I	can	have	any	formal	program	you	like,	but	I	still	understand	noth-ing.’ 	 Searle’s	 thought-experiment	 has	 generated	 a	 vast	 critical	 literature	 but	73what	is	perhaps	the	most	curious	aspect	would	seem	to	have	attracted	relatively	little	comment.	The	fact	is	that,	far	from	being	a	modiVication	of	the	Turing	Test	(a	subversive	substitution	of	a	philosopher	for	a	computer)	Searle	has	described	precisely	the	scenario	that	Turing	had	in	mind.	It	will	be	remembered	that	a	Di-gital	 Computer	 is	 to	 play	 against	 another	 ‘discrete	 state	 machine’	 which	 has	already	 played	 the	 Imitation	 Game	—	 and	 this	 could	 hardly	 be	 anything	 other	than	 the	 sort	 of	Human	 Computer	 Searle	 jokes	 about.	 ‘The	 idea	 behind	 digital	computers	may	be	explained	by	saying	that	these	machines	are	intended	to	carry	out	 any	operations	which	 could	be	done	by	 a	human	 computer’,	writes	Turing.	‘The	human	computer	is	supposed	to	be	following	Vixed	rules;	he	has	no	author-ity	to	deviate	from	them	in	any	detail.’ 	Elsewhere,	Turing	refers	to	this	combin74 -ation	of	a	human	with	written	instructions	as	a	paper	machine:	‘A	man	provided	with	paper,	pencil,	and	rubber,	and	subject	to	strict	discipline,	 is	 in	effect	a	uni-versal	machine.’ 	And	 it	 is	 clear	 that	Turing’s	 earliest	 thoughts	 concerning	 the	75Imitation	Game	arose	from	experience	with	the	experimental	chess-programmes	run	 on	 such	 paper	 machines:	 ‘One	 can	 produce	 “paper	 machines”	 for	 playing	chess’. 	Even	Turing’s	 self-adjusting	algorithms,	were	 run	on	himself	 and	not	a	76Digital	Computer:	‘I	made	a	start	on	the	latter	but	found	the	work	altogether	too	laborious	at	present’,	he	explains.	 ‘When	some	electronic	machines	are	in	actual	operation	 I	 hope	 that	 they	will	make	 this	more	 feasible	…	 instead	of	 having	 to	work	with	a	paper	machine	as	at	present’. 	It	is	safe	to	conclude	the	position	on	77Strong	AI	 frequently	 attributed	 to	 Turing	 can	 hardly	 have	 been	 held	 by	 a	man	who	had	worked	for	so	many	years	locked	up	in	Chinese	Room.	Indeed,	we	can	begin	 to	 understand	why	 Turing’s	 surprise	 at	 the	 results	 produced	 by	 his	ma-
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chines	 is	 quite	 so	 pronounced.	 As	 the	 sentient	 CPU	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 such	 a	ma-chine,	Turing	would	often	have	 found	himself	performing	operations,	 following	his	own	written	instructions,	that	he	could	never	have	anticipated.	‘Certainly	the	machine	can	only	do	what	what	we	do	order	it	to	perform,	anything	else	would	be	a	mechanical	fault’,	he	remarks.	‘But	there	is	no	need	to	suppose	that,	when	we	give	it	its	orders	we	know	what	we	are	doing,	or	what	the	consequences	of	these	orders	are	going	to	be.’	He	concludes	that:	 ‘One	does	not	need	to	be	able	to	un-derstand	how	these	orders	 lead	 to	 the	mechanism’s	 subsequent	behaviour,	any	more	 than	 one	 needs	 to	 understand	 the	mechanism	 of	 germination	when	 one	puts	a	seed	in	the	ground.’ 	78
!The	analogy	 is	 suggestive.	One	could	argue	 that	agriculture	 is	 a	 sort	of	 self-ad-justing	 routine,	 run	 on	 human	 hardware	 for	millennia,	 evolving	 in	 response	 to	environmental	pressures	without	much	in	the	way	of	conscious	innovation,	pro-ducing	outcomes	that	no	one	could	have	foreseen	at	 inception.	 If	we	repeat	the	error	of	anthropomorphising	thought	we	might	speculate	that	while	Machine	In-telligence	 cannot	 be	 an	 ego	 it	 might	 nevertheless	 be	 a	 person,	 in	 the	 original	sense	of	that	term;	a	virtual	entity	sustained	by	a	cultural	practice	—	e.g.	persona	
Victa.	 ‘For	as	men	make	automata	that	move	themselves	by	springs	and	wheels,’	Hobbes	declared,	‘so	men	create	that	great	LEVIATHAN	…	which	is	but	an	artiVicial	man,	in	which	the	sovereignty	is	an	artiVicial	soul…’ 	This	position	would	be	con79 -gruent	with	what	is	called	the	Virtual	Mind	Reply	to	Searle’s	Chinese	Room,	but	would	 only	 perpetuate	 the	 Promethean	 error	 we	 seek	 to	 disentangle.	 Turing	himself	 expressed	 the	 hope	 that	 digital	 computing	machines	would	 eventually	stimulate	a	considerable	interest	in	symbolic	logic	and	mathematical	philosophy	(noting	that	the	language	in	which	one	communicates	with	the	machines,	i.e.	the	language	of	instruction	tables,	forms	a	sort	of	symbolic	logic). 	For	this	reason	I	80would	like	to	close	this	section	by	suggesting	that	the	clearest	conception	of	what	such	a	machine	for	thinking	might	be	in	essence	is	to	be	found	not	in	the	Ultron	computers	of	sci-Vi,	but	in	the	thoroughly	low-tech	“Glass	Bead	Game”	imagined	by	Hermann	Hesse	in	Das	Glasperlenspiel	(1943).		
!
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	 A	reader	who	chanced	to	be	ignorant	of	the	Glass	Bead	Game	might	imag-	 ine	such	a	Game	pattern	as	rather	similar	to	the	pattern	of	a	chess	game,		 except	 that	 the	 signiVicances	of	 the	pieces	 and	 the	potentialities	 of	 their		 relation-ships	to	one	another	and	their	effect	upon	one	another	multiplied		 many-fold	and	an	actual	content	must	be	ascribed	to	each	piece,	each	con-	 stellation,	each	chess	move,	of	which	this	move,	conViguration,	and	so	on	is		 the	symbol. 		81!Inspired	 by	 Liebniz’s	 unrealised	 fantasy	 of	 a	 universal	 language	 (which	would	eventually	culminate,	via	that	philosopher’s	engagement	with	the	I	Ching	or	Book	
of	Changes,	in	the	Binary	Code),	the	Glass	Bead	Game	is	a	cultural	practice	unique	to	the	university-province	of	Castalia;	a	metalanguage	that	began	as	a	game,	but	that	developed	over	time	into	a	sophisticated	medium	capable	of	comprehending	the	 arts	 and	 sciences,	 permitting	 players	 to	 construct	models	 of	 those	 thought	processes	 through	 which	 humans	 interpret	 reality:	 ‘a	 language	 of	 symbol	 and	formulas,	 in	which	mathematics	 and	music	 played	 an	 equal	 part,	 so	 that	 it	 be-came	possible	 to	 combine	astronomical	 and	musical	 formulas,	 to	 reduce	math-ematics	and	music	to	a	common	denominator,	as	it	were.’ 	Like	Liebniz,	the	in82 -ventor	 of	 the	 game	 has	 taken	 inspiration	 from	 the	 prevalent	misconception	 of	Hanzi	script	as	a	system	of	ideograms;	and	the	one	glass	bead	game	described	in	any	detail	in	the	book	is	based	on	the	ritual	Confucian	pattern	for	the	building	of	a	house. 	In	this	context,	it	might	be	amusing	to	relate	that	this	“Chinese	Room”	83is	performed	for	the	Magister	Ludi	by	an	assistant	who	speaks	no	Chinese!	(‘It	was	far	too	late	for	him	to	learn	it	now.’ )	And,	as	with	Turing’s	early	coding,	the	Vinal	84programme	is	run	on	a	human	machine.	‘With	a	luminous	golden	stylus	he	delic-ately	inscribed	character	after	character	on	the	small	tablet	before	him,	and	the	same	 characters	promptly	 appeared	 in	 the	 script	 of	 the	Game,	 enlarged	a	hun-dredfold,	upon	the	gigantic	board	on	the	rear	wall	of	the	hall,	to	be	spelled	out	by	a	thousand	whispering	voices,	called	out	by	the	Speakers,	broadcast	to	the		coun-try	and	the	world.’ 		85
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One	might	expect	the	Prime	Radiant,	the	computer	in	Isaac	Asimov’s	Foundation	
Trilogy	 (1942-1953)	 to	be	rather	more	high-tech:	a	near-contemporary	(in	real	time)	of	the	monkish	Castalia,	the	Galactic	Empire	possesses	nuclear	power	and	star-cruisers	and	energy-shields.	So	 it	comes	as	something	of	a	surprise	 to	 Vind	(in	the	Vinal	part	of	the	trilogy)	that	the	Prime	Radiant	is	really	little	more	than	a	big	white-board.	 ‘First,	a	pearly	white,	unrelieved,	then	a	trace	of	faint	darkness	here	and	there,	and	Vinally,	the	Vine	neatly	printed	equations	in	black,	with	an	oc-casional	red	hairline	that	wavered	through	the	darker	forest	like	a	staggering	ril-let.’ 	Since	their	Vleeting	appearance	on	the	pocket-calculator	of	Hari	Seldon	the	86psychohistorian	 in	 the	 Virst	 book,	 the	 symbols	 projected	 by	 the	 Prime	 Radiant	have	been	modiVied	by	a	series	of	human	computers,	who	have	made	alterations	to	the	programme	according	to	instructions	in	response	to	external	data.	‘It	was	a	room	which,	through	the	centuries,	had	been	the	abode	of	pure	science	—	yet	it	had	none	of	the	gadgets	with	which,	through	millennia	of	association,	science	has	come	 to	 be	 considered	 equivalent’,	 explains	 Asimov.	 ‘It	 was	 a	 science,	 instead,	which	dealt	with	mathematical	concepts	only,	in	a	manner	similar	to	the	specula-tion	of	ancient,	ancient	races	in	the	primitive,	prehistoric	days	before	technology	had	come	to	be;	before	Man	had	spread	beyond	a	single,	now-unknown	world’. 	87Like	Castalia’s	Glass	Bead	Game,	psychohistory	is	considered	the	culmination	of	a	Leibnizian	symbolic	 logic:	but	where	the	Masters	of	Castalia	have	decisively	re-jected	 that	 ‘philosophy	 of	 history	 of	which	Hegel	 is	 the	most	 brilliant	 and	 also	most	dangerous	representative’,	psychohistorians	of	the	Second	Foundation	have	applied	their	skills	in	computer	programming	to	the	historical	process,	modelling	with	apparent	success	the	entire	history	of	a	Galactic	Empire	over	tens	of	thou-sands	of	years. 	In	fact,	the	series	of	crises,	and	the	dialectical	progression,	pre88 -dicted	 by	 psychohistorians	 cannot	 fail	 to	 recall	 the	 Historical	 Materialism	 of	Marx;	while	 the	Seldon	Plan	to	alleviate	 the	worst	of	 the	coming	catastrophe	 is	entirely	 in	keeping	with	the	mania	 for	planning	that	characterised	the	era	 from	1925	to	1975	(from	Lenin’s	New	Economic	Plan	and	Le	Corbusier’s	urbanism	to	the	Keynesian	stimulus	package	and	China’s	Great	Leap	Forward).	‘Psychohistory	was	the	quintessence	of	sociology’,	explains	Asimov;	‘it	was	the	science	of	human	behaviour	 reduced	 to	mathematical	equations.’ 	This	 is	 said	 to	be	possible	be89 -cause,	while	 individual	human	beings	are	unpredictable,	 the	reaction	of	human	
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mobs	 can	 be	 treated	 statistically.	 ‘The	 larger	 the	mob	 the	 greater	 the	 accuracy	that	 could	be	achieved”,	 claims	Asimov.	 ‘And	 the	size	of	 the	human	masses	 that	Seldon	worked	with	was	no	less	than	the	population	of	the	Galaxy,	which	in	his	time	was	numbered	in	the	quintillions.’ 	If	the	determinism	in	this	vision	of	his90 -tory	is	(ostensibly)	now	a	thing	of	the	past,	the	suggestion	that	sociology	might	eventually	come	to	be	regarded	as	‘that	branch	of	economics	that	deals	with	the	reactions	of	human	conglomerates	 to	 Vixed	social	and	economic	stimuli’,	 can	be	seen	 to	 have	 proven	most	 prescient,	 anticipating	 the	 application	 of	 humanity’s	ever-greater	processing-power	to	the	problems	of	macroeconomic	management	over	the	latter	half	of	the	twentieth	century. 	‘Someday	there	will	exist	a	uniVied	91social	 science	 of	 the	 kind	 that	 Asimov	 imagined,’	 insists	 Paul	 Krugman,	 Neo-Keynesian	 and	Nobel	 Prize	Winning	 economist	 in	 his	 introduction	 to	 the	 Folio	edition	of	The	Foundation	Trilogy	(2012),	‘but	for	the	time	being	economics	is	as	close	to	psychohistory	as	you	can	get. 	92
!This	 essay	 has	 shown	 that	 even	Paper	Machines	 are	 capable	 of	 projecting	 illu-sions	that	can	undermine	our	very	ontologies,	and	I	would	suggest	in	closing	that	computational	technology	have	also	worked	to	overwhelm	our	faith	that	human	agency	might	shape	our	own	history.	And	this	is	the	real	danger	involved	in	com-puter	modelling.	Not	that	a	computer-generated	model	might	predict	our	future	but	that	we	permit	such	a	model	to	determine	our	future	through	unquestioning	faith	in	its	veracity.	Binding	ourselves	to	a	pattern	of	thought	not	reality	but	rati-ocination,	we	impose	restrictions	on	our	capacity	to	think	out	new	options,	and	to	 take	control.	And	while	 the	computer	simulations	 favoured	 in	 the	Neoliberal	era,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 linear	 modelling	 that	 characterised	 the	 earlier	 Social	Democratic	 consensus,	might	 seem	 to	make	no	 claims	 to	veracity,	 such	 simula-tions	 have	 proven	more	 than	 capable	 of	 seducing	 theorists	 and	 policy-makers	into	 serious	 errors	 too:	 a	process	documented	 at	 length	by	 economic-historian	Philip	Mirowski	 in	his	book	Machine	Dreams:	How	Economics	Became	a	Cyborg	
Science	(2001).	Indeed,	this	essay	has	discovered	that	Turing,	like	Poe	before	him,	seems	to	have	believed	that	seducing	into	error	was	nothing	less	than	a	Standard	Test	for	any	truly	Analytical	Engine.	If	simulations	are	likely	to	remain	an	import-ant	component	 in	 the	management	of	our	socio-political	reality,	Mirowski	must	
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surely	be	right	to	suggest	that	they	will	only	be	‘dependably	productive	…	when	they	have	been	developed	and	transformed	from	the	status	of	representations	to	the	status	of	technologies’.  93
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